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Abstract
Hedge Funds are considered as one of the portfolio management sectors which shows
a fastest growing for the past decade. An optimal Hedge Fund management requires
an appropriate risk metrics. The classic CAPM theory and its Ratio Sharpe fail to
capture some crucial aspects due to the strong non-Gaussian character of Hedge
Funds statistics. A possible way out to this problem while keeping the CAPM
simplicity is the so-called Downside Risk analysis. One important benefit lies in
distinguishing between good and bad returns, that is: returns greater or lower than
investor’s goal. We revisit most popular Downside Risk indicators and provide new
analytical results on them. We compute these measures by taking the Credit Su-
isse/Tremont Investable Hedge Fund Index Data and with the Gaussian case as
a benchmark. In this way an unusual transversal lecture of the existing Downside
Risk measures is provided.
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1 Introduction
Hedge Funds are considered as one of the portfolio management sectors which
shows a fastest growing for the past few years [1,2]. These funds have been in
existence for several decades but they do not have become popular until the
1990’s. It is said that the Hedge Funds are capable of making huge profits but
sometimes also suffer spectacular losses. Due to their at least apparent high
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and unpredictable fluctuations, it is necessary to keep the risks we take when
we trade with Hedge Funds under rigorous control [3,4].
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the classic method for quantify-
ing the risk of a certain portfolio [5,6]. Basically, the so-called Ratio Sharpe [6]
evaluates the quality of a certain asset by normalizing the asset growth ex-
pectation with its volatility, that is its standard deviation. Thus, based on the
fact that the asset growth expectation must be large and volatility low, a good
Hedge Fund holds a high Ratio Sharpe. And the better the Hedge Fund the
more attractive and advisable is to invest in this fund. Typically, Hedge Fund
managers begin to trade with an specific Hedge Fund only when this fund gets
an annual Ratio Sharpe greater than 1 [1]. It is considered that only if Ratio
Sharpe crosses this threshold the fund can provide benefits after the trading
costs removal.
However, the CAPM theory is sustained under the hypothesis that underly-
ing asset is Gaussian distributed. In this case, investor only needs to know
the mean and the variance of the return. As it has been observed [7,8,9,10],
this appears to be an unrealistic scenario in financial markets with important
implications in the risk analysis within the mean-variance framework (see for
instance [11]). The situation is much more dramatic in the Hedge Fund uni-
verse since these funds are clearly non-Gaussian having wild fluctuations and
strong asymmetries in price changes. These funds are characterized by their
big sensitivity to the market crashes and by trading with products such as
derivatives that show a pronounced skewness in their price distribution. For
instance, a very well-known commodity trader adviser (CTA) Hedge Fund
had a poor Ratio Sharpe (0.19) but, despite this mediocre mark, their earn-
ings during the 2000 raised beyond the 40% [1]. Conversely, after 31 months
of trading, the famous fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) had an
appealing ratio (4.35) and nothing seemed to forecast its posterior debacle [1].
These two examples are not exceptional cases, and they make us reexamine
the validity of the CAPM theory. There is evidence that the CAPM method
is not complete enough for evaluating the risks involved in the Hedge Fund
management.
Our aim here is to explore some alternatives in the context of the so-called
Downside Risk analysis [1,11,12]. The main contributions of the current paper
are the following. We introduce some of the most popular Downside Risk indi-
cators sparse in the literature. We also provide new analytical results related
to these risk measures and finally make a large set of empirical measurements
to the Credit Suisse/Tremont Investable Hedge Fund Index Data. The appli-
cation of all these Downside Risk indicators to the same data set has thus
allowed to revisit them in a transversal way which is quite unusual in the
literature. We have finally found that representing the indicators in terms of
a modified Ratio Sharpe (see below) is more appropriate than doing it as a
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function of the investor’s goal. This replacement with respect what is typi-
cally done in the literature makes possible a better data collapse and it in
turn enables to compare easily the performance between different Hedge Fund
trading styles.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data set used
for the Downside Risk indicators. The following section is devoted to present
the backgrounds of the Downside Risk approach. Afterwards, we present the
Adjusted Ratio Sharpe in Section 4, the Sortino ratios in Section 5, and the
Gain-Loss Ratio is left to Section 6. The equivalence between the Omega
function and the Gain-Loss Ratio under specific circumstances is given in
Section 7 while a discussion about the error behind the risk measures we use
is left to Section 8. Finally, Section 9 provides some conclusions.
2 The Hedge Fund data set
There are several third-party agencies that collect and distribute data in Hedge
Fund performance [1]. For this paper, we have used the data supplied by the
Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index [13]. This company is a joint venture be-
tween Credit Suisse and Tremont Advisers Inc which combines their resources
to set several benchmarks for a large collection of Hedge Fund strategies. They
provide a master index and series of sub-indices that represent the historical
returns for different Hedge Fund trading styles [1,13].
The weight of each fund in an index is given by the relative size of its assets
under management. This makes the CST Index the first asset-weighted indices
in the industry. Asset-weighting, as opposed to equal-weighting, provides a
more accurate depiction of an investment in the asset class. In addition, CST
has a web site [13] that provides an up-to-date and historical data and allows
the user to select and download data. Information available is public. The
selection of funds for the CST indices is done every quarter. The process
starts by considering all 2,600 US and offshore Hedge Funds contained in the
TASS database, with the exception of funds of funds and managed accounts.
In the present case, we have analyzed the monthly data for these indices during
the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006. This
period corresponds to 145 data points for each Hedge Fund style. This is not
a very large data set but it is enough to perform a reasonably fair and reliable
statistical estimation of the quantities we here deal with.
In Fig. 1 we show the indices dynamics that were all normalized to 100 at
the beginning of 1994. We also show the monthly logarithmic return change
R(t) = ln[S(t+∆)/S(t)] where S(t) is current price index and ∆ is fixed and
3
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Fig. 1. The price and the monthly return change time series for the Credit Su-
isse/Tremont (CST) Index and subindices during the period between 31st December
of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006.
equals to one month. In what follows the return change is always over one
month and this is the reason why we avoid to specify the value ∆. Table 1
shows how the mean-variance framework fails to explain the statistics of the
majority of Hedge Fund styles monthly returns. The kurtosis can raise to
values larger than 20 while the skewness is usually negative and may take
values larger than 3.
3 The Downside Risk Metrics: Main definitions
For the reasons mentioned above, the so-called Downside Risk analysis has
been gaining wide acceptance in recent years [3,4,11]. One important benefit
of the Downside Risk lies in distinguishing between good and bad returns: Good
returns are greater than the goal, while bad returns are the ones below the
goal. The Downside Risk measures incorporate an investor’s goal explicitly and
define risk as not achieving the goal. In this way, the further below the goal,
the greater the risk. And, in the opposite side, returns over the goal does not
imply any risk. Within this approach, a portfolio’s riskiness may be perceived
differently by investors with different goals. This is more realistic than the
CAPM theory approach where all investors have the same risk perception.
Typically, the target return is set to be to the minimum acceptable return for
4
Table 1
Main statistical values for the whole set of Hedge Fund style indices during the
period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January of 2006. We show the
first moment, the standard deviation, the kurtosis and the skewness for the monthly
returns. Most of the indices have a kurtosis larger than one and some of them also
have a non negligible negative skewness. The mean-variance framework might fit
well only for very few of them (the “Managed Futures” and the “Equity Market
Neutral” styles).
Hedge Funds indices mean std dev kurt skew
Credit Suisse/Tremont Index 0.009 ± 0.002 0.0225 ± 0.0010 2.3 -0.040
Convertible Arbitrage 0.0070 ± 0.0011 0.0138 ± 0.0004 3.2 -1.4
Dedicated Short Bias −0.002 ± 0.004 0.049 ± 0.004 1.2 0.63
Emerging Markets 0.007 ± 0.004 0.048 ± 0.007 6.5 -1.1
Equity Market Neutral 0.0079 ± 0.0007 0.00838 ± 0.00011 0.34 0.30
Event Driven 0.0092 ± 0.0014 0.017 ± 0.002 28 -3.8
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.0051 ± 0.0009 0.0109 ± 0.0005 18 -3.2
Global Macro 0.011 ± 0.003 0.032 ± 0.002 3.0 -0.21
Long/Short 0.010 ± 0.002 0.029 ± 0.002 4.0 -0.042
Managed Futures 0.005 ± 0.003 0.034 ± 0.002 0.47 -0.099
Event Driven Distressed 0.011 ± 0.002 0.019 ± 0.002 22 -3.3
Event Driven Multistrategy 0.008 ± 0.002 0.018 ± 0.002 19 -2.9
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 0.0063 ± 0.0010 0.0121 ± 0.0004 7.2 -1.4
considering profitable the trading operation. And the statistical risk would be
then associated with the unsuccessful tentatives of obtaining a higher return
than the target return. However, the target return could also be related to the
maximum loss that a Hedge Fund can afford measuring risk in a somewhat
similar way as the Value at Risk measures do [14]. We will here cover a broad
window ranging the annual target return values from -30% to +30%.
We consider the price of the asset S at time t and its initial price S0 at time
t = 0. Let us thus define the Excess Downside as
D(R, T ) ≡ max[0, T − R] =


T − R if T > R,
0 if T ≤ R;
(1)
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where R ≡ ln(S/S0) is the subsequent monthly return change and T is the tar-
get return. Observe that the mathematical expression for the Excess Downside
is identical to the one for the payoff of the European put option [14].
We can ineed study the first and second moments of the Excess Downside
D(T ). Recall that the first moment is defined as
µ−(T ) ≡ E [D(R, T )] =
T∫
−∞
(T −R)p(R)dR, (2)
while the second moment reads
d(T )2 ≡ E
[
D(R, T )2
]
=
T∫
−∞
(T −R)2p(R)dR, (3)
where p(R) is the probability density function (pdf) of the return R. The
square root of the second moment (3) is also called Excess Downside Deviation
(EDD).
Figure 2 represents the empirical ratio d(T )/σ between the EDD and the
volatility (standard deviation of the returns) in terms of the target return T
with λ = (µ− T )/σ. The other two parameters involved are
µ = E [R] , (4)
which is the first moment of the return and
σ2 = Var[R] (5)
is the return variance. Both are directly computed from historical data. Ob-
serve that the ratio d/σ for the Hedge Fund data indices may differ significantly
from the Gaussian case, specially for T ’s lower than µ (λ > 0). We discuss
deeper the results of this plot in the next section.
However, before proceeding we shall notice that the CST Index results have
been plotted with error bars for the y-axis. The bars represent the standard
error of the measurements. Figure 2 plots an algebraic combination of aver-
ages and we apply standard rules of error propagation of each standard error
measurement. We have done it done for the rest of trading style indices with
very similar conclusions but in order to lighten the information in the plot
we do not show these errors bars. We neither show the standard error for the
x-axis. Their error bars do not change for different values of λ and they typ-
ically affect the second significative digit of lambda. All these comments are
6
also valid for the rest of figures and empirical results in the paper. We will go
a bit further on this topic in Section 8.
4 The Adjusted Ratio Sharpe
A first possible extension of the method aims to keep the CAPM approach
but with a rough correction based on the empirical EDD computed as defined
in Eq. (3). This is probably the simplest sophistication to the mean-variance
framework. Its interest is based on the fact that it is aimed to replace the
volatility σ by a more appropriate risk measure such as d(T ). We recall that
the CAPM measures risk of a certain asset with the well-known
Ratio Sharpe =
µ− r
σ
, (6)
where r is the risk-free interest rate ratio, µ = E [R] and σ2 = Var[R]. John-
son etal. [15] propose an Adjusted Ratio Sharpe as “the Ratio Sharpe that
would be implied by the fund’s observed Downside Deviation if returns were
distributed normally”.
Let us study further this risk measure both analytically and empirically. We
first assume that the returns are Gaussian:
p(R) =
1√
2piσ
exp
[
−(R− µ)
2
2σ2
]
. (7)
We also define a modified Ratio Sharpe with the quotient
λ ≡ µ− T
σ
. (8)
This variable λ is very important not only in this rough correction of the
Ratio Sharpe but also in the analysis we will perform for other alternative risk
indicators we will show herein. The effort to represent the risk measures in
terms of λ is of the new contributions of this paper. The forthcoming measures
in the next sections can be all represented exclusively in terms of lambda if
the underlying is Gaussian distributed. Nonetheless, it will be also helpful to
keep on working with the λ even for the empirical data set where Gaussian
hypothesis is weakly sustained.
7
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Fig. 2. The quotient between the Excess Downside Deviation and the volatility for
the CST Index and subindices for the period between the 31st Dec of 1993 until
the 31st Jan of 2006. We show the quotient d(T )/σ in terms of λ = (µ − T )/σ for
several Hedge Fund styles when target return T is between −30% and 30% annual
rates. The inset provides the same results but in a logarithmic scale. The empirical
results are compared with the Gaussian case given by Eq. (9). The error bars in the
CST Index correspond to the standard errors of each λ measurement.
Therefore, from the Excess Downside Deviation (3) and assuming Gaussian
returns we can write
d(T )2
σ2
=
(
λ2 + 1
)
N(−λ)− λN ′(λ). (9)
where N(·) is the probability function
N(λ) =
1√
2pi
λ∫
−∞
exp
(
−y
2
2
)
dy, (10)
while its derivative is denoted by a prime and reads exp (−λ2/2) /√2pi.
Figure 2 plots the d(T )/σ ratio in terms of the modified Ratio Sharpe (8)
for a broad range of target returns T , from -30% until 30% annualized rates.
We represent data in terms of λ by taking the empirical averages µ and σ
(cf. Eqs. (4)-(5)). When λ < 0 (T > µ), we can observe that the empirical
d(T )/σ follows reasonably well the Gaussian curve given by Eq. (9). However,
when λ > 0 (T < µ), the results may differ significantly from the Gaussian
8
Table 2
The monthly Adjusted Ratio Sharpe for several Hedge Fund indices. We first derive
the monthly Excess Downside Deviation ratio d(T )/σ for several Hedge Fund indices
when annual return growth is T = 5%. Once we get these quantities we numerically
invert Eq. (9). We thus compare these results with the Ratio Sharpe which is takes as
a risk-free interest ratio the data from Bloomberg with ticker US0001M Index which
corresponds to the one-month LIBOR index (London Interbank Offered British
Bankers Association Rate).
Hedge Funds d(T )/σ Adj. Ratio Sharpe Ratio Sharpe
Credit Suisse/Tremont Index 0.609 0.63 −0.18 ± 0.06
Convertible Arbitrage 0.729 -0.13 0.29 ± 0.07
Dedicated Short Bias 0.735 -0.16 −0.07 ± 0.16
Emerging Markets 0.746 -0.23 −0.002 ± 0.002
Equity Market Neutral 0.447 1.82 0.55 ± 0.08
Event Driven 0.756 -0.29 0.25 ± 0.09
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.845 -0.80 0.11 ± 0.04
Global Macro 0.626 0.51 0.22 ± 0.07
Long/Short 0.612 0.61 0.17 ± 0.06
Managed Futures 0.688 0.12 0.03 ± 0.02
Event Driven Distressed 0.725 -0.11 0.29 ± 0.10
Event Driven Multistrategy 0.740 -0.20 0.19 ± 0.07
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 0.705 0.01 0.21 ± 0.06
curve. These more pronounced differences for T < µ can be adduced to the
effect of the negative skewness. In this case, we are mainly taking the left
wing of the distribution where returns are smaller than the average. The more
negative the skewness is, the larger the d(T )/σ ratio. For instance, the “Event
Driven” index has a skewness more negative than -3 and it describes one of the
curves with higher values of the d(T )/σ ratio. In contrast, the “Equity Market
Neutral” index remains even below the Gaussian curve mainly because of its
slighlty positive skewness.
We can finally numerically invert the ratio d(T )/σ obtained from Eq. (9). We
will thus obtain the so-called Adjusted Ratio Sharpe. That is: the lambda that
corresponds to the Excess Downside Deviation ratio in the event of returns
are Gaussian and then accomplishing the equality (9). We show the resulting
empirical results in Table 2 for the special case when T = 5%. The Adjusted
Ratio Sharpe may also differ significantly from the Ratio Sharpe placed far
outside its standard error region.
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Fig. 3. The monthly Sortino Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index and
subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st January
of 2006. We show the monthly SoR(T ) given by Eq. (11) in terms of lambda given
by Eq. (8) for several Hedge Fund styles when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian Sortino Ratio (14)
and observe that the historical data results are not very far from the Gaussian
hypothesis. The error bars in the CST Index correspond to the standard error for
each λ measurement.
5 The Sortino and Upside Potential ratios
Sortino etal. propose in their works [16,17,18,19] more drastic modifications
of the Ratio Sharpe. In contrast with the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe, the pair of
indicators we here introduce are self-consistent measures that do not need to
assume that the underlying asset is Gaussian. All averages involved in these
indicators are directly computed from the historical data.
However, these two new ratios have a similar apperance than the Ratio Sharpe.
In both cases, the risk-free rate is replaced by the target return and the volatil-
ity by the Excess Downside Deviation. We here also claim that the modified
Ratio Sharpe λ will still be useful to represent all Hedge Fund styles into a
single plot.
The first tentative is the so-called Sortino Ratio (SoR) defined as follows:
SoR(T ) =
µ− T
d(T )
, (11)
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Fig. 4. The monthly Upside Potential Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST)
Index and subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the
31st January of 2006. We show the UPR(T ) given by Eq. (11) in terms of λ given by
Eq. (8) for several Hedge Fund styles and when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian UPR (16). The
inset shows the same plot but with a logarithmic scale in the UPR axe. The error
bars in the CST Index correspond to the standard errors of the quotient for each λ
measurement.
where d(T ) is the EDD given by Eq. (3). There is a sophistication made by
the same Sortino whose computation also replaces return average µ by the
excess return average. This new measure is worried about the return average
up to the target return. Thus, the Upside Potential Ratio (UPR) is defined as
UPR(T ) =
µ+(T )
d(T )
, (12)
where
µ+(T ) =
∞∫
T
(R− T )p(R)dR, (13)
or equivalently µ+(T ) = µ − T + µ−(T ) (cf. Eq.(2)). It is indeed possible to
write one risk measure in terms of the other. That is: UPR(T ) = SoR(T ) +
µ−(T )/d(T ).
Both measures behave as the Ratio Sharpe. The greater ratio corresponds to
11
the better asset. Let us calculate the quotients given Eqs. (11) and (12) in
case that returns were Gaussian and here comes our new contribution on the
study of the SoR and UPR measures. We first need the Gaussian d(T ) which
is already given by Eq. (9). In such a case the Sortino Ratio reads
SoR(T ) =
λ
[(λ2 + 1)N(−λ)− λN ′(λ)]1/2 , (14)
while, again taking into account that under the Gaussian hypothesis the upside
average (13) is
µ+(T ) = σλN (λ) + σN
′(λ), (15)
the Upside Potential Ratio reads
UPR(T ) =
λN (λ) +N ′(λ)
[(λ2 + 1)N(−λ)− λN ′(λ)]1/2 . (16)
We note that our results on both risk measures have been expressed in terms
of the modified Ratio Sharpe λ = (µ − T )/σ. And we here claim that this is
still convenient even in the case we do not have a Gaussian distribution for
the returns.
Some special and limiting cases are
−1 < SoR(T ) <∞ and 0 < UPR(T ) <∞,
where upper and lower bounds respectively correspond to the limiting cases
T →∞ and T → −∞.
These measures could be annualized as it was done with the Ratio Sharpe.
Recall that the monthly Ratio Sharpe is annualized when we multiply the ratio
by the factor
√
12. However, in principle, this is not as easy in the present case
as it has been thoroughly investigated in Ref. [17].
We represent the Sortino and Upside Potential ratios in Figs. 3 and 4. We
there plot the Gaussian case as a benchmark and in terms of lambda. The
empirical data is also shown in terms of λ to get the results comparable. For
the empirical data we have computed the risk measures for a broad range of
target returns T , from -30% until 30% annualized rates. At first sight, we do
not perceive much differences between the two plots. We may however say that
UPR is able to scatter in a slightly better way the different trading styles. In
both risk measures and in the linear scale, the differences with respect the
Gaussian curve become important only for positive λ (µ > T ). However, the
12
UPR risk measure is the only that can be also represented in a logarithmic
scale. The relative distances to the Gaussian curve are quite symmetric for
negative and positive λ’s. For this reason, we consider more powerful the UPR.
In addition and from the error bars, we can also state that the replacement of
the mean by the upside average does not bring much more noise to the UPR
risk measure in comparison to the SoR risk measure noise. In general, we can
also say that the large errors bars does not allow to get reliable conclusions
for positive and moderate values of lambda.
In both risk measures and for a broad range of lambda, the index style closer
to the Gaussian curve corresponds to the “Equity Market Neutral”. The set
of trading styles could be sorted in several groups and without observing
big discrepancies in that classification depending on which risk measure we
take. The resulting groups are also consistent with the ones we can identify
in Fig. 2. Particularly, for large λ (negative T ) we can easily see that the
risk in most of the “Event Driven” indices and the “Fixed Income Arbitrage”
index is comparable. The reason why Gaussian curve is beyond most of the
indices risk measures for positive lambda should be found in the negative and
nonnegligible skewness in the data set of these Hedge Fund indices.
6 The Gain-Loss Ratio
Bernardo and Ledoit [20] propose another risk measure called Gain-Loss Ratio
(GL). This mesaure is probably the most well-grounded measure between the
existing alternatives to the CAPM theory. In contrast with the Sortino ratios,
GL have no comparable magnitudes with the Ratio Sharpe.
In the simplest scenario, the attractiveness of an investment opportunity is
measured by the Gain-Loss Ratio
GL(T ) =
µ+(T )
µ−(T )
, (17)
which is the fraction between the averages of positive and negative parts of
the payoff after removing the trading costs included in the target return T .
The framework provides an alternative approach to “asset pricing in incom-
plete markets that bridges the gap between the two fundamental approaches
in finance: model-based pricing and pricing by no arbitrage” [20]. The GL(T )
ratio constitutes the basis to an alternative asset pricing framework. By limit-
ing the maximum Gain-Loss ratio, the admissible set of pricing kernels can be
restricted and it is also possible also to constrain the set of prices that can be
13
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Fig. 5. The monthly Gain-Loss Ratio for the Credit Suisse/Tremont (CST) Index
and subindices during the period between 31st December of 1993 until the 31st
January of 2006. We show the ratio given by Eq. (17) in terms of lambda given by
Eq. (8) for several Hedge Fund styles and when target return is between T = −30%
and T = 30% annual rates. We compare them with the Gaussian case (22). The
inset shows the same plot but with a logarithmic scale in the GL axis. The error
bars in the CST Index correspond to the standard errors of each λ measurement.
assigned to assets [20]. In other words, we admit that there are arbitrage op-
portunities but limited in a certain range of prices. In the same way, Bernardo
and Ledoit [20] state that the theoretical no arbitrage assumption is related
to the mathematical demand that the GL is 1.
We can now explore this risk measure in a similar way as done in the previous
sections and this corresponds to our new contribution to this risk indicator.
Following the notation used above we have that
µ−(T ) ≡ E
[
(T − R)+
]
=
T∫
−∞
(T − R)p(R)dR, (18)
and
µ+(T ) ≡ E
[
(R− T )+
]
=
∞∫
T
(R− T )p(R)dR. (19)
14
Note that from these definitions we can obtain the following expression
µ+(T )− µ−(T ) = µ− T = λσ. (20)
where we also take into account the definition of λ given by Eq. (8).
We have already obtained the µ+(T ) average in the case that the returns are
Gaussian. From Eqs. (15) and (20), we thus have
µ−(T )
σ
= −λN(−λ) +N ′(λ), (21)
and
µ+(T )
σ
= λN(λ) +N ′(λ).
Therefore, the Gain-Loss Ratio reads
GL(T ) =
µ+(T )
µ−(T )
= 1 +
λ
N ′(λ)− λN(−λ) . (22)
Note that no arbitrage corresponds to λ = 0 which means that average µ
equals the target return T . Also observe that the GL has not time units. This
means that the annual GL should have the same value as the monthly GL.
This is a very interesting and powerful property that avoids any discussion
about the way we derive the annualized risk indicator as it happens with the
Sortino ratios and the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe.
The bounds of the ratio are
0 ≤ GL(T ) ≤ ∞, (23)
which respectively correspond to T → ∞ and T → −∞. The GL, at least
in the Gaussian framework, is a non decreasing function in terms of lambda
whose fastest growing correspond to λ > 0 regime, that is T < µ. Thus, this
risk measure is very sensitive to small changes when λ > 0 while for negative
lambda the ratio does not provide too much information.
Figure 5 confirms this very last statement. The same plot also depicts the em-
pirical results for a broad range of annualized target returns between −30%
and +30%. The more pronounced Gaussian behaviour and in a broader do-
main of lambda again corresponds to the “Equity Market Neutral” strategy
although other styles such as the “Managed Futures” also follows nicely the
curve. In contrast with the SoR and UPR risk measures, it is much more dif-
ficult to detect groups with similar values. Therefore, in this sense, previous
measures seem to be more appropriate than the Gain-Loss Ratio.
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We could also observe that the Gaussian GL gives a good measure for moderate
values of positive lambdas (0 < λ < 1) to an important number of indices. In
fact, within this regime, there are only two trading styles below the Gaussian
performance. This behaviour appears to be also in clear contrast with the
previous risk indicators.
7 The Omega function
There exists another risk measure which may represent a different way of
evaluating the Gain-Loss ratio. Their authors do not tell anything about this
fact [21,22]. The GL ratio authors are mainly worried about the benchmark
risk-adjusted probability measure while the so-called Omega function authors
consider that their indicator can be looked simply as another representation
of the probability distribution of the underlying. This is certainly a different
perspective but we here show that the Omega function is equivalent to the
GL under quite general conditions. As to the case of the Gain-Loss ratio, we
do not look at the fundamentals of the economic theory that lies behind but
simply focuss on the statistical properties of the downside averages we take.
Keating and Shadwick [21,22] and proposes the following Omega function
measure:
Ω(T ) =
I2(T )
I1(T )
, (24)
where
I2(T ) =
∞∫
T
(1− F (R))dR and I1(T ) =
T∫
−∞
F (R)dR
using that F (R) is the cumulative distribution function of the return R, i.e.,
F (R) =
R∫
−∞
p(x)dx.
We now try to evaluate the expressions for I1 and I2. Firstly, integrating by
parts we have
I1(T ) =
T∫
−∞
F (R)dR = TF (T )− lim
R→−∞
RF (R)−
T∫
−∞
Rp(R)dR. (25)
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Before proceeding further we show how the second summand is zero under
some circumstances. We note that
lim
R→−∞
RF (R) = lim
R→−∞
R2p(R).
The limit value will thus depend on the way the pdf p(R) decays to 0 as
R→ −∞. As far as p(R) decays faster than 1/R2, this second summand can
be neglected. This will be for instance the case of the Gaussian and the Laplace
distributions or even a power law with a tail index larger than 2. However,
the next steps of these calculations would not be applicable to the power law
distributions with a slower decay, that is: p(R) ∼ 1/|R|α with 1 < α ≤ 2 as
R→ −∞. In this latter case, all the moments of the pdf are infinite.
We now come back to Eq. (25). Observe that it is also possible to rewrite the
expression as
TF (T )−
T∫
−∞
Rp(R)dR =
T∫
−∞
(T − R)p(R)dR,
and finally see (cf. Eq. (18)) that
I1(T ) = E
[
(T − R)+
]
= µ−(T ). (26)
Secondly, we can do the same with I2. Under the condition that the pdf decays
faster than 1/R2 as R → ∞, similar calculations apply and lead us to state
that (cf. Eq. (19))
I2(T ) =
∞∫
T
(1− F (R))dR = µ+(T ). (27)
Therefore, according to the values derived for I1 and I2 and the definition
given by Eq. (17), we find that the Omega function and the Gain-Loss Ratio
coincide since
Ω(T ) =
µ+(T )
µ−(T )
= GL(T ). (28)
We must however insist that this is only true when the pdf asymptotically
decays faster than 1/R2 when |R| → ∞. In such a case, the Omega will have
the same bounds and behavior as the GL and results in Section 6 can be also
applied to the Omega function. In favour of Ω indicator, we may say that its
way to handle the empirical data is more reliable (less noisy) specially when
we have a small number of points. We have left to Appendix A some other
new results related to what Keating and Shadwick call the ”Omega risk”.
17
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Fig. 6. The standard error behaviour for the Downside averages when underlying
is Gaussian distributed and normalized with respect to σ. Upside and downside
averages (solid lines) are accompanied with the standard error (dashed lines) for
M = 145 as given by Eqs. (31)–(32). The standard deviations of the same estimators
only adopts values between 1 and 0. Upside and Downside averages have an opposite
behaviour with respect to lambda.
8 Error analysis: A discussion
The error analysis of the Downside Risk averages is a quite unexplored ter-
ritory. We do not have here the aim of making a deep analysis on this topic
since this deserves a whole paper. We would however like to provide at least
few insights under the perspective of the Hedge Funds universe we have here
studied.
Under the hypothesis that underlying follows a Brownian motion (returns are
Gaussian distributed) we can quantify the error of the upside averages, the
downside average and the excess downside deviation. The easiest thing to do
is to assign its error magnitude to the standard deviation of those estimators.
In such a case, one can obtain
1
σ2
E
[
(T − R)+2
]
=
d(T )2
σ2
= (λ2 + 1)N(−λ)− λN ′(λ) (29)
and
1
σ2
E
[
(R − T )+2
]
= (λ2 + 1)N(−λ) + λN ′(λ). (30)
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Fig. 7. The standard error behaviour for the Excess Downside Deviations when
underlying is Gaussian distributed and normalized with respect to σ.
If we join these expressions with the upside and downside averages given by
Eqs. (15) and (21), we can derive the standard deviations and subsequently
the standard errors:
StdErr
[
(T − R)+
]
=
1√
M − 1
{
E
[
(T − R)+2
]
− µ−(T )2
}1/2
, (31)
StdErr
[
(R− T )+
]
=
1√
M − 1
{
E
[
(R− T )+2
]
− µ+(T )2
}1/2
, (32)
where M is the data points used for the estimation. The result of these op-
erations is also given in Fig. 6. One should notice that the values of these
functions are constrained between 0 and 1/
√
M − 1 and their behaviours are
quite similar being antisymetric with respect to lambda. We can observe that
when we take M = 145 which corresponds to our Hedge Fund data set length
the relative error is always below the 15%. For the EDD case, the calculation
is a bit longer but one can also obtain
1
σ4
E
[
(T − R)+4
]
= (λ4 + 6λ2 + 3)N(−λ)− (λ3 + 4λ)N ′(λ). (33)
Following the same procedure as to the one for the upside and downside aver-
age, we can finally obtain its standard error. The aspect of its behaviour both
in a linear and logarithmic scales is provided in Fig. 7. We can observe that
the relative error is again below 15% in almost the whole regime of lambda
19
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Ex
ce
ss
 D
ow
ns
id
e 
De
via
tio
n 
/ S
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
via
tio
n 
(m
on
thl
y)
monthly lambda
Theoretical Gaussian
Gaussian simulation (200 points)
Gaussian simulation (100 points)
Gaussian simulation (20 points)
0.1
1
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
Fig. 8. The Excess Downside Deviation for a Gaussian simulated data set in terms of
the monthly lambda. We present the theoretical curve when underlying is Gaussian
distributed and compare it with simulations of different lenghts. The convergence
to theoretical values is quite fast.
where we get the empirical observations, that is: −1.5 < λ < 1. In absolute
values the error increases as lambda becomes more negative but its relative
value might be quite high for λ > 1.
The moderate values for this relative errors certainly let us believe that the
risk measures provided in the previous Sections are reliable enough. We must
however take these bars to the assignation of the errors of these magnitudes
with real care since these estimators are strongly biassed as one can see from
the definitions in Section 3. The standard deviation would solely provide the
order of magnitude of that error. A more accurate analysis of the empirical
probability density we have behind each Hedge Fund style would be required to
get a more reliable estimation of the degree of confidence of our observations.
We can go a bit further in this discussion and also check the convergence of
these estimators. We have simulated a Bownian realization for the monthly
returns with the empirical mean and volatility of the CST Index shown in
Table 1. Having 20, 100 and 200 simulated timesteps, we have computed the
Excess Downside Deviation in the same way as in previous sections. Figure 8
shows that the convergence to the theoretical curve is quite fast. With 100
steps we already have a reasonable estimation of the EDD and with a larger
data set what we mainly achieve is a reduction of the error bars of our es-
timation. We have done the same procedure with the upside and downside
20
averages obtaining similar conclusions. Therefore, this experiment also seems
to confirm that the results provided in previous sections are quite reliable.
At least under the Gaussian assumption, the convergence of our estimators is
fairly reached for the number of points empirically available.
9 Final remarks
Hedge Funds have enjoyed increasing levels of popularity coupled with opacity
and some myths [1,2]. We here have followed this recent interest in studying the
Hedge Funds for an academic purpose (see for instance Refs. [23,24] published
in this journal). This is possible since data such as the Credit Suisse/Tremont
Investable Hedge Fund Index is now easily available.
The strong non Gaussian character of financial markets have led to consider
risk measures alternatives to CAPM theory in the context of the Downside
Risk [1,3,4,11]. The measures are able to distinguish between good and bad
returns compared to our own personal target T in a very simple manner. While
the CAPM theory takes the average return growth and the return variance, the
Downside Risk framework uses another two statistical measures which indeed
keep folded some information of higher order moments. In particular, we have
focused on the following risk measures: the Adjusted Ratio Sharpe, the Sortino
ratios and the Gain-Loss Ratio from both a theoretical and empirical points of
view. We have seen that the Downside Risk framework provides quite robust
measurements and it appears to be the most natural extension to the CAPM
theory and its mean-variance framework.
The Hedge Funds is a field where these risk measures have most promising
future. There are mainly two reasons. The first reason is the existence of wild
fluctuations and pronounced negative skewness in data. And secondly is that
there are few empirical data points available (of the order of hundreds of
points). This last reason makes impossible to work with other more sophisti-
cated risk metrics which are more sensitive to the wildest fluctuations.
However, we have also seen that the Gaussian results for the studied Downside
Risk measures are still important. We have shown that they work very well
as a benchmark if we represent the empirical risk measures in terms of a
modified Ratio Sharpe λ = (µ−T )/σ. Perhaps quite surprisingly, we can also
see in Figs. 3, 4, and 5 that the Gaussian trading investment behavior works
better than most of the sophisticated trading style indices. The main reason
lies on the fact that a Hedge Fund provides high benefits with the cost of
having in most cases a negative skewness. Downside Risk measures take into
account this asymmetry and include it to the risk perception. This is therefore
another argument for using the Downside framework since Ratio Sharpe might
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wrongly overvalue the quality of a Hedge Fund by ignoring the skewness (and
the kurtosis) effects in risk analysis.
To summarize, let us point out the main new contributions of the current
paper. We have aimed to revisit some of the most popular Downside Risk
indicators and have gone further on their application to the Hedge Fund uni-
verse in two different aspects. Firstly, the use of the same data set has enabled
to get a reliable comparison between these risk indicators which is certainly
difficult to get through the existing literature. And secondly, we have derived
new analytical expressions for these risk indicators in terms of λ = (µ− T )/σ
that allow to get a closer idea on the exact meaning of each indicator. In
the same lines, we want to stress the fact that the modified Ratio Sharpe λ
appears to be a more useful parameter to work with instead of the target
return T . It becomes very helpful to put the results in a broader context and
in reference to a benchmark distribution such as the Gaussian one or even to
compare different trading styles indices. Thanks to this fact, we have detected
several indices with quite similar behaviour for the Sortino ratios and in the
quotient d(T )/σ. However, the Gain-Loss Ratio is blind to this structure and
unable to untangle these trading styles. For all these reasons and others dis-
cussed above, we can conclude that among the Sortino ratios the UPR is the
best risk indicator for the Hedge Fund universe. We should however take all
these conclusions with real care due to the small data set available. There is a
strong presence of noise that we have here quantified with the standard error
and the subsequent error bars computed with error propagation. To check the
soundness of our conclusions we have discussed the error in the Downside Risk
Metrics when underlying is Gaussian distributed. We have observed that the
relative error based on our empirical data set length is quite reasonable being
below the 15%. We have also shown via simulations that the convergence of
our estimators is quite fast since a hundred points is enough to get a reliable
estimation of the Gaussian theoretical values involved in the Downside Risk
Metrics.
There are many other interesting aspects to study under the current perspec-
tive. One possibility is to deeper study these risk indicators when returns follow
another return distribution like a Laplace [25,26] or for instance a power law
distribution. We could also compute the here presented risk measures when
target return is another asset. Another possibility is to study the effect of these
analysis in the multi-factor market modeling [5,27,28,29,30]. In any case, all
these topics should be left for future investigations.
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A The Omega risk
The authors [21,22] also define the Omega risk as
ΩR(T ) ≡ ∂ ln Ω
∂T
=
1
Ω
∂Ω
∂T
. (A.1)
This variable wants to measure the sensitivity of the Omega function to the
changes in the target return T . Therefore, according to the definition (24),
ΩR(T ) =
1
I2
∂I2
∂T
− 1
I1
∂I1
∂T
.
But, from Eqs. (26)–(27) and taking into account that [31]
∂I2
∂T
= F (T )− 1 ∂I1
∂T
= F (T ),
we finally obtain
ΩR(T ) = −
[
1
I2
+
(
1
I1
− 1
I2
)
F (T )
]
.
Assuming that the returns are Gaussian and recalling that λ = (µ−T )/σ, we
have that
ΩR(T ) =
(
1
µ−
− 1
µ+
)
N(λ)− 1
µ−
,
since µ− is given by Eq. (21), µ+ is given by Eq. (15),
∂µ−
∂λ
= −σN(−λ) and ∂µ+
∂λ
= σN(λ).
The Omega risk is always negative since the Ω is a non-decreasing function.
Finally, we should mention that under an affine transformation of the form
T → φ(T ) = AT +B
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the function transforms as
Ω→


Ωˆ [φ(T )] = Ω(T ) if A > 0;
Ωˆ [φ(T )] = 1/Ω(T ) if A < 0.
This is also true for the Gain-Loss Ratio equivalent risk indicator.
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